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R ethinking antitrust
policy toward RPM
BY JOHN B. KIRKWOOD*
Resale price maintenance is a particularly dangerous vertical intra-
brand restraint. Because of its direct impact on price competition, it
is likely to harm consumers in a substantial number of cases. At the
same time, RPM is likely to benefit consumers in a significant num-
ber of other cases. Given these mixed effects, the ideal legal standard
would distinguish between those instances in which RPM is anticom-
petitive and those in which it is procompetitive. While Leegin thought
that the full rule of reason could play this role, it did not acknowl-
edge what every scholar who has looked at the issue has found-that
the full rule of reason has operated in practice as a standard of virtual
per se legality, absolving almost every restraint examined. This article
proposes an alternative approach-a presumption of illegality com-
bined with safe harbors-and explains why it is likely to produce
better results at lower cost.
* Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty Development,
Seattle University School of Law; Editor, Research in Law and Economics; Senior
Fellow, American Antitrust Institute; former Assistant Director for Planning
and Assistant Director for Evaluation, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade
Commission.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Numerous people, at AAI and elsewhere, have helped make this a
better article, including Rick Brunell, Bert Foer, Warren Grimes, Greg Gundlach,
Lily Kahng, Thom Lambert, Gregory Silverman, Bob Steiner, an anonymous
reviewer, and participants in a workshop at Seattle University School of Law.
@ 2010 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has methodically dis-
mantled the controls that antitrust law once imposed on vertical
intrabrand restraints. More than thirty years ago, in Sylvania,' the
Court overruled Schwinn2 and held that vertical customer and territo-
rial restrictions could not be condemned automatically but had to be
judged under the rule of reason. Almost twenty years later, the Court
jettisoned another per se rule in Kahn,' holding that maximum verti-
cal price fixing must also be evaluated under the rule of reason.
Finally, in Leegin, the Court took its most monumental step, overrul-
ing a ninety-six-year-old precedent and declaring that resale price
maintenance (RPM)-vertical minimum price fixing-had to be
assessed under the full rule of reason.
The Court's last step is the most disturbing because RPM is the
most competitively dangerous vertical intrabrand restraint. It is the
only one that directly prevents dealers from reducing the price of a
manufacturer's product, and both theory and evidence suggest that it
is likely to be anticompetitive in a substantial number of cases. While
RPM may not be anticompetitive in the overwhelmingly majority of
cases, or perhaps even in most, there are too many documented cases
of consumer harm, and too many ways in which it could harm con-
sumers, to conclude that anticompetitive instances are rare or trivial.
In consequence, the ideal legal standard for RPM would make it pos-
sible for plaintiffs to challenge and courts to condemn its anticompet-
itive manifestations. The ideal legal standard would not immunize
virtually every case. Yet that is exactly what the full rule of reason-
the legal standard the Court mandated in Sylvania, Kahn, and Leegin-
is likely to do. Every scholar who has looked at the issue has
concluded that the full rule of reason operates in practice as a stan-
dard of de facto legality. Under it, defendants almost always win.
1 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), overruling Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
4 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
5 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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Antitrust needs a more discriminating standard, one that would
in practice and at reasonable cost distinguish between instances of
RPM that are likely to harm consumers and instances that are likely
to benefit them. This article suggests that a presumption of illegality
combined with safe harbors would achieve these goals. This standard
would make it much easier for plaintiffs to challenge plainly anticom-
petitive RPM. At the same time, it would allow defendants to quickly
dispose of cases attacking plainly innocuous RPM. And in mixed
cases, where both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are
present, this standard would do at least as well as the full rule of rea-
son in differentiating between beneficial and harmful RPM.
The European Commission (EC) has already adopted a presump-
tion of illegality. For years, it has treated RPM as a "hardcore restric-
tion" that presumptively violates article 81(1) of the Treaty of Rome.'
In recent comments, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) endorsed
the EC's approach and argued that it could be a model for U.S. courts.
In two respects, however, the EC's standard appears to be too restric-
tive. First, it does not provide any safe harbors for RPM, even in cir-
cumstances, such as new entry, where the restraint is highly unlikely to
be anticompetitive. Second, according to the American Bar Association,
the EC has never actually accepted a justification for RPM: its rebut-
table presumption of illegality is in fact irrebuttable.8 If that is true, it is
6 See Comm. Reg. 2790/1999, Art. IV, 1999 O.J. (L336) 21, 23; see also Luc
Peeperkorn, Resale Price Maintenance and Its Alleged Efficiencies, 4 EuR. COMPErTrON
J. 201, 202-03 (2008) (describing the Commission's presumption of illegality).
, See Comments of the American Antitrust Institute on the European
Commission's Proposed Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines on Ver-
tical Restraints, Sept. 27, 2009, at 4-5, available at http://www.antitrustinsti-
tute.org/archives/files/AAI%20Comments%20on%20EC%20Vertical%2OGui
des_092820090810.pdf.
8 See Joint Comments of the American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law and Section of International Law on the Proposal of the Euro-
pean Commission for a Revised Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines
on Supply and Distribution Agreements, Sept. 2009, at 24, available at
http://www.abanet.org/Antitrust/at-comments/2009/09-09/comments-
proposal-ec.pdf ("the Sections are not aware of an instance in the last 50 years
in which a firm has successfully made efficiency arguments to defend an
RPM clause under EC competition law").
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too harsh. Since RPM is likely to be procompetitive in a substantial
number of cases, the aim should not be to recreate the per se ban under
a different guise, but to develop a standard that reliably and cost-effec-
tively distinguishes the anticompetitive instances from the procompeti-
tive. A truly rebuttable presumption with safe harbors would do that.
The Leegin Court recognized this overall objective, observing that
the lower courts should structure the rule of reason over time so that
it becomes "a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive
restraints and to promote procompetitive ones."' The Court was also
sensitive to the anticompetitive effects of RPM, noting that under the
full rule of reason the lower "courts would have to be diligent in elim-
inating [RPM's] anticompetitive uses from the market,"" for "the
potential anticompetitive consequences of vertical price restraints
must not be ignored or underestimated."" Indeed, the Court even
suggested that as the "courts gain experience ... applying the rule of
reason," 2 they can establish "presumptions where justified."" But
despite AAI's urging," the Court did not adopt any presumptions
that would make RPM easier to challenge, leaving the lower courts
with the impression that they could "structure" the full rule of reason
by clarifying the plaintiff's burdens under it, but they could not, for
the time being at least, ease those burdens.
Reinforcing that impression, in her first article on the issue, Chris-
tine Varney, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division, did not mention, much less evaluate, any presumptions of
illegality. Instead, noting that the Supreme Court has never "engaged
9 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 897.
0 Id.
" Id. at 894.
12 Id. at 898.
13 Id. at 898-99.
14 See Brief of the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondent at 28-29, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) (recommending, if the Court overrules
Dr. Miles, a rebuttable presumption of illegality, stating: "If businesses wish
to raise prices to consumers by agreement, it is hardly unreasonable to place
the burden on them to justify the practice in a particular case").
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in an abbreviated analysis of vertical restraints,"1 5 she simply pro-
posed a "structured" version of the full rule of reason, under which a
plaintiff would have to demonstrate certain elements in order to make
out a prima facie case that the challenged "RPM is apt to be anticom-
petitive."'6 In his article in The Antitrust Bulletin's Special Issue:
Antitrust Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance after Leegin (Volume
I), Lambert recommends a similar approach."
In its Nine West decision," the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
was somewhat more intrepid. While allowing Nine West to adopt
's Christine A. Varney, A Post-Leegin Approach to Resale Price Maintenance
Using a Structured Rule of Reason, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 22.
16 Id. Thus, if the plaintiff contended that the RPM was anticompetitive
because it facilitated manufacturer collusion, the plaintiff would have to
prove that "(1) RPM is used pervasively in the relevant market; (2) market
structure conditions are conducive to price coordination; and (3) RPM plausi-
bly helps significantly to identify cheating." Id. at 24.
V Thomas A. Lambert, A Decision-Theoretic Rule of Reason for Minimum
Resale Price Maintenance, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 167 (2010). The burdens that a
plaintiff would have to carry under Lambert's approach make sense as a matter
of pure economic theory, for they all relate to the likelihood that an instance of
RPM is anticompetitive. But like the existing full rule of reason, Lambert's
approach would impose heavy burdens on a plaintiff, even when RPM was
harmful, as Lambert recognizes. He states: "Few challenges to instances of min-
imum RPM will succeed under the proposed rule." Id. at 222. He justifies this
restrictive rule on two grounds: (1) "more instances of RPM will be procompeti-
tive than anticompetitive" and (2) "the harm from wrongly acquitting an anti-
competitive instance of RPM is likely to be less significant than the harm from
wrongly convicting a procompetitive instance of the practice." Id. at 191-92.
Neither basis, in my view, warrants such a pro-defendant tilt. While it
may be true that RPM is more likely to be beneficial than harmful, this con-
clusion is not compelled by either theory or evidence, as I explain below.
More important, even if it were true, the legal standard that would follow
from this conclusion is one that would protect more RPM than it condemns,
not one that would allow almost all RPM. Finally, Lambert's comparison of
false positives and false negatives is skewed because he assumes that only
false positives would create erroneous precedent. See id. In fact, court deci-
sions that mistakenly exonerate anticompetitive instances of RPM would also
create precedent, increasing the likelihood of false negatives in the future.
18 In re Nine West Group Inc., No. C-3937, 2008 WL 2061410 (FTC May 6,
2008).
HeinOnline  -- 55 Antitrust Bull. 427 2010
428 : THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 55, No. 2/Summer 2010
RPM, it ventured that Leegin "might" permit RPM to be condemned
under a truncated or "quick look" rule of reason if the plaintiff estab-
lished one or more of the factors that Leegin identified as relevant to
determining whether RPM is anticompetitive." Although Leegin itself
never indicated that these factors would trigger a truncated inquiry,
the FTC's approach, if adopted by the courts, would be a step for-
ward. It would make it easier for plaintiffs to challenge harmful
instances of RPM. The FTC's approach would not be ideal, however,
for these factors would still impose heavy burdens on many plaintiffs,
leading, most likely, to a significant number of cases in which RPM is
incorrectly permitted.
The remainder of this article explains why a standard of presump-
tive illegality coupled with safe harbors would be superior to the
principal alternatives-the full rule of reason and a truncated rule of
reason based on the Leegin factors. Part II shows that RPM is the most
competitively dangerous restraint and is likely, absent any legal con-
straints, to cause anticompetitive effects in a substantial number of
cases. Part III strengthens this conclusion by demonstrating that the
principal asserted justifications for RPM are often questionable, either
because the claimed efficiency does not apply, because it is not signifi-
cant, or because it can be achieved through other means. Parts II and
III also recognize, however, that RPM is likely to be procompetitive in
19 Id. at 6. The Leegin factors are the prevalence of RPM in the relevant
market, the source of the restraint, and the existence of market power at the
manufacturer or dealer level. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 897-98. Thus, if RPM is
widely used in the market and it was imposed on the manufacturers by deal-
ers with market power, the practice is likely to be anticompetitive.
Because Nine West sought to modify an existing order, the FTC placed
the burden on it of showing that its use of RPM would not harm competition.
Id. at 3. Nine West carried this burden, according to the FTC, because it estab-
lished that all the Leegin factors were absent in its case. Id. at 6-7. In an ordi-
nary private suit for damages, the FTC's approach would presumably require
the plaintiff to show that one or more Leegin factors were present in order to
trigger a truncated rule of reason.
The FTC did not specify how many factors a plaintiff would have to
establish. The more factors required, the more the FTC's approach would
approximate the structured rule of reason Varney proposed.
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a substantial number of cases. Not only are there several valid and
empirically supported efficiency explanations for RPM, but the pre-
conditions for anticompetitive impact will frequently not be met. Part
IV demonstrates, however, that despite RPM's mixed effects, the full
rule of reason is not an appropriate method for controlling it, since
the requirements of the full rule of reason are difficult to satisfy, even
when the challenged conduct is anticompetitive. As a result, this stan-
dard is likely to amount to a regime of de facto legality. Part V points
out that the same criticism applies, although with less force, to the
FTC's standard in Nine West, a truncated rule of reason that would
20
require the plaintiff to prove one or more of the Leegin factors. Part
VI describes the approach I recommend-presumptive illegality com-
bined with safe harbors-and summarizes its advantages.
II. COMPETITIVE HARMS
RPM is the only vertical intrabrand restraint that prevents dealers
in a manufacturerfs product from reducing the price of that product.21
20 In the remainder of the article, I do not return to the "structured" rule
of reason proposals that Varney and Lambert have offered because they
appear roughly comparable in the burdens they would impose to the existing
full rule of reason. What Varney and Lambert are trying to do, after all, is to
make the full rule of reason less amorphous and more rigorous by laying out
exactly what a plaintiff should have to show in order to make out an econom-
ically sound prima facie case that the challenged RPM is anticompetitive.
They are not trying to lighten the plaintiff's load.
Thus, Lambert proposes that "a plaintiff seeking to state a circumstantial
prima facie case based on a manufacturer collusion theory should have to show
that: 1. the manufacturer market is concentrated; 2. the product upon which RPM
is imposed is relatively fungible; 3. there are substantial entry barriers into the
manufacturer's market; and 4. the use of RPM is widespread among manufactur-
ers of the pmduct." Lambert, supra note 17, at 218 (footnotes omitted). This would
require the plaintiff to cover essentially the same bases it would have to cover
under the full rule of reason (market definition, market power inferred from mar-
ket share, entry barriers, and likely anticompetitive effects). See infra part IV.
21 To simplify the discussion, I refer to "manufacturers" and "dealers" as
the upstream and downstream firms in a production and distribution system.
My analysis is not limited, of course, to markets for manufactured goods or to
distribution systems in which the resellers are called dealers rather than
wholesalers, retailers, or franchisees.
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Thus, if a manufacturer of one brand adopts RPM, dealers in that
brand cannot engage in direct price competition with other dealers
carrying the same brand. They also cannot use that brand to engage in
direct price competition with other dealers carrying different brands.
In short, unlike vertical nonprice restraints, RPM directly interferes
with both intrabrand and interbrand price competition, making it the
most dangerous vertical intrabrand restraint.22 Leading scholars con-
cur. Areeda and Hovenkamp declare: "[T]here is a strong consensus
that RPM poses greater threats to competition than do most nonprice
restraints, perhaps significantly greater."' Klein and Murphy state:
"[I]ndustrywide price restraints may serve as an enforcement device
for cartel arrangements and represent more of a potential antitrust
problem than nonprice restraints."24
22 While nonprice restraints tend to reduce the intensity of both price
and nonprice competition among dealers of the same brand, they do not pre-
vent a dealer in one brand from engaging in price competition with a dealer
carrying another brand. RPM, in contrast, poses a direct obstacle to interbrand
price competition.
To be sure, RPM does not completely forestall price competition. As
noted below, dealers subject to RPM may be able to offer free shipping, bun-
dled discounts, or reduced prices on other brands. See infra part III.A. But on
the brand in question, they cannot practice the most direct and important
form of price competition-reducing the price of the product.
23 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 1620.1
(Supp. 2008) [hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP.]; see also 8 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1630b (2d ed. 2004) [here-
inafter 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP] ("It is . . . entirely reasonable to regard resale
price maintenance as a more pervasive threat to competition than nonprice
restraints.").
24 Benjamin Klein & Kevin Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract
Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 280 n.20 (1988). See also Warren S.
Grimes, A Dynamic Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance: Inefficient Brand Pro-
motion, Higher Margins, Distorted Choices, and Retarded Retailer Innovation, 55
ANTITRUST BULL. 101 (2010) ("There are a number of features that suggest
[RPM] poses greater competitive risks and offers fewer potential procompeti-
tive benefits than vertical restraints that restrict distribution."); Richard M.
Brunell, Overruling Dr. Miles: The Supreme Trade Commission in Action, 52
ANTITRUST BULL. 475, 521 (2007) ("Besides doing less harm, nonprice vertical
restraints are more likely to have procompetitive benefits than vertical price
restraints might have.").
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Because of RPM's direct impact on resale prices, it is likely to
cause prices to consumers to increase. In addition, those higher prices
may be anticompetitive-and reduce the welfare of consumers-
when RPM produces or facilitates collusion at the manufacturer level,
collusion at the dealer level, suppression of more efficient or innova-
tive dealers, excessive resale services, or misleading promotion?
A. Higher prices
The purpose of RPM is to raise resale prices. All of the asserted jus-
tifications for RPM depend on its ability to raise resale prices, and as
Brunell's review of the evidence indicates, RPM has generally had this
effect.2 6 For example, studies of the fair trade era in the U.S. (a period in
which states could allow RPM within their borders) show that prices of
items subjected to fair trade were significantly higher in states where
fair trade was permitted than in states where RPM remained illegal and
that fair trade cost consumers several billion dollars a year.27 Other
studies have found that when sellers ended RPM in major industries
like light bulbs, retail drugs, and blue jeans, consumers realized sub-
stantial savings.' The FTC estimated that record companies' efforts to
25 These are the most commonly discussed but not the only ways in
which RPM may harm competition. For other scenarios, see Greg Shaffer, The-
ories of Harm from Resale Price Maintenance (FTC Hearings on Resale Price
Maintenance Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/work-
shops/rpm/.Docs/gschafferppt02l9.pdf. For instance, Shaffer describes the
following case: "Suppose an upstream firm with market power sells to com-
peting downstream firms who also have market power. . . . With RPM, the
upstream firm with market power can increase its profit by requiring that
retailers set a higher retail price on its product even though at the same time
it lowers the wholesale price it charges to retailers. Both actions serve to guar-
antee retailers a larger markup on the upstream firm's product, and the retail-
ers respond by raising the retail prices of the competing products in their
product line." Id.
26 See Brunell, supra note 24, at 496-97; see also 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 23, 1[ 1604b (RPM "tends to produce higher consumer prices than
would otherwise be the case. The evidence is persuasive on this point").
27 See H.R. REP. No. 94-341, at 3 (1975).
28 See F.M. Scherer, Comment on Cooper et al.'s "Vertical Restrictions and
Antitrust Policy," 1 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 65, 72-74 (2005).
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restrain resale prices of CDs caused consumers to pay as much as $480
million more than they would have without RPM.'
The higher prices produced by RPM would not harm consumers,
of course, if the practice generated services or information that con-
sumers judged to be worth the extra money. In such a case, RPM
would benefit both the manufacturer that adopted the practice and its
ultimate customers. In most of the following settings, however, all of
which have anticompetitive effects, RPM would increase the profits of
manufacturers or dealers but reduce the welfare of consumers.
B. Collusion at the manufacturer level
Because of RPM's adverse impact on interbrand price competition,
it can facilitate price collusion at either the manufacturing level or the
dealer level. At the manufacturer level, RPM can enhance the effective-
ness of collusion, tacit or explicit, in several ways. First, RPM makes
resale prices more stable and more visible, increasing the ability of
manufacturers to coordinate their pricing strategies. In addition, RPM
reduces the incentive for any manufacturer to cheat on the collusive
price, since the manufacturer's price cut cannot be passed directly on
to consumers. Moreover, RPM greatly reduces the propensity of deal-
ers to engage in price wars among themselves, which helps manufac-
turers collude because if price wars break out among dealers, they will
tend to seek relief by asking for price cuts from their suppliers, under-
mining price stability at the manufacturing level.0 Thus, one of Wal-
Mart's top executives stated: "I don't have any question but that
competitive pricing at the retail level creates more pressure on manu-
facturers' factory prices than is present when they're able to set retail
prices as well."' Moreover, the FTC recently alleged that record com-
panies had taken steps to raise the retail prices of their products in
29 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Record Companies Settle FTC
Charges of Restraining Competition in CD Music Market (May 10, 2000),
available at http:/ /www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.htm.
30 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, [ 1606c (noting "instances in
which intense price competition at the dealer level has led to price cuts at the
manufacturing level").
31 S. Robson Walton, Antitrust, RPM, and the Big Brands: Discounting in
Small-Town America (II), 15 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv. 11, 16 (1983).
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order to end a price war among retailers, a conflict that had caused
several retailers to seek lower prices from one of the companies. 32
RPM is unlikely to facilitate collusion, tacit or express, at the man-
ufacturer level unless the structure of the market is conducive to it. As
a general rule, that means that the market must be concentrated, entry
barriers must be significant, the manufacturers using RPM must make
up a substantial portion of the market, and differentiation of the vari-
ous manufacturers' brands must not be so great that coordinated pric-
ing is infeasible. While these conditions imply that RPM is unlikely to
be a collusion-facilitating device in many instances, in other cases the
restraint is likely to reinforce manufacturer collusion. In C-O-Two Fire
Equipment, for example, a group of producers imposed RPM on their
dealers as part of a horizontal price fixing arrangement."
C. Collusion at the dealer level
RPM is an even more effective tool for cementing collusion at the
dealer level, since it eliminates the most direct form of price competi-
tion among dealers, price competition on product prices. Here, too,
market conditions must be conducive to such collusion," but there are
32 See Complaint, In re Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., No C-
3974 (FTC 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov./os/2000/09/unicomp.htm;
see also Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42
U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1375 (2009) (summarizing complaint).
3 See C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1952).
A The dealers as a group must have sufficient market power to impose
RPM on one or more manufacturers, and the manufacturer(s) involved must
have enough market power, singly or collectively, that a retail price increase on
the product(s) in question would not cause the dealers to lose an unacceptable
quantity of sales. As Hovenkamp notes, dealers are more likely to be able to
inflict RPM on a manufacturer when "economies of scope at the retail level make
single-brand distribution impractical," for in this case, a manufacturer "cannot
easily integrate into retailing on its own." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POUCY 451 (3d ed. 2005). When retailing is dominated by "large multi-
brand, multiproduct" dealers, moreover, entry may be quite difficult and these
dealers may be able to "exert substantial power over [their] suppliers." Id. at 452.
As this discussion indicates, dealer collusion can harm consumers even if
the colluding dealers carry only a single manufacturer's brand. As long as that
brand is differentiated from other brands, RPM imposed on the manufacturer
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a significant number of actual examples, as Hovenkamp emphasizes:
"A wealth of history shows that dealers have attempted to use RPM
imposed by suppliers to facilitate horizontal dealer collusion.""
Indeed, some of the best-documented instances of RPM have
involved dealer cartels, including the well-known, Depression-era,
drug store cartel." Just last year, the Third Circuit concluded that a
cartel of Mack Truck dealers had, among other things, induced Mack
Truck to impose RPM on a price-cutting dealer." In contrast, nonprice
restraints, which by definition do not fix product prices, are less effec-
tive in facilitating explicit or tacit price collusion at the dealer level.M
D. Suppression of more efficient or innovative dealers
RPM inhibits the development of more efficient forms of distri-
bution because it prohibits a more productive or innovative distrib-
utor from passing on the benefits of its superior efficiency in lower
product prices.39 This obstacle to economic progress has frequently
by colluding (or otherwise powerful) dealers can force up the price of its
brand and reduce the welfare of consumers. In short, a restraint directed pri-
marily at intrabrand competition can still injure the competitive process. See
Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward After Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform of
the Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467, 472-73 (2008).
35 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 451 (noting, for example, that "the Dr.
Miles decision ... was the byproduct of one of the biggest cartels in American
history-an agreement by members of national associations of wholesale and
retail druggists to fix the price of proprietary medical drugs" and that, in
addition, "in many of the early RPM decisions, there was strong evidence of
horizontal as well as vertical collusion").
3 See Thomas R. Overstreet Jr. & Alan A. Fisher, Resale Price Maintenance and
Distributional Efficiency: Some Lessons from the Past, 3 CONTEMP. PoL'Y ISSUES 43,
49-50 (1985) (during the 1930s, a cartel organized by the National Association of
Retail Druggists "achieved virtually universal compliance with a price-fixing pol-
icy-despite very large numbers and an extremely unconcentrated market").
3 See Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204
(3d Cir. 2008).
38 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, 1 1630b ("Historically . .. price
rather than nonprice restraints have been the vehicle chosen by dealer organi-
zations to limit competition among their members.").
3 Brunell, supra note 24, at 501-02.
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been noted. Steiner observed that "growth of ... more efficient new
retailing forms often has been seriously retarded by their inability
to obtain well-known manufacturers' brands, free of RPM." 40
Areeda and Hovenkamp point out that in the absence of RPM,
"price competition among dealers favors the expansion of those
with efficient scale and methods, thus lowering the cost of distribu-
tion."4' Sullivan and Grimes agree: "Preserving entry opportunities
for new retailers and new retailing approaches is a critical compo-
nent to the dynamic growth of our economy. Intrabrand competi-
tion serves this goal by preserving one of the new entrant's more
competitive tools: the ability to discount popular branded items
that draw customers." 42 The Office of Fair Trading recently studied
the elimination of RPM on books in the United Kingdom and con-
cluded that it contributed to the entry and rapid growth of innova-
tive forms of book retailing-Internet sellers and supermarkets. 43 In
addition, Scherer and Ross conclude, there is evidence that in
Europe, "the appearance of supermarkets was significantly
retarded until laws discouraging resale price maintenance were
passed.""
4 Robert L. Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal With the Price-Cutting
Retailer: When Are Vertical Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 407, 424 &
n.47 (1997).
41 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, 1[ 1632c4.
42 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST:
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 335 (2d ed. 2006). See also Grimes, supra note 24, at
128 n.56 ("Many of the most efficient retailing methods involve a marketing
strategy that relies on minimum service and rapid turnover of inventory. The
warehouse store or the Internet outlet, for example, generally offers few
amenities. Under these business models, there are fewer opportunities to pass
efficiencies on except in the form of lower prices, and it is precisely this
avenue that will be denied to them when RPM is imposed.").
43 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT UPON PRO-
DUCTIVITY OF ENDING RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE ON BOOKS (2008), available at
http://oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/economic_research/oft981.pdf.
4 F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 553 (3d ed. 1990). See also Overstreet & Fisher, supra note
36, at 49 ("The National Association of Retail Druggists (NARD) was aston-
ishingly successful in using RPM and related political influence to delay the
development of discount drug store chains").
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Once an innovative form of distribution becomes established,
RPM is unlikely to be used to suppress it. By that point, manufactur-
ers have become accustomed to its benefits, and some of the innova-
tive distributors may be large enough to forestall the adoption of
RPM.45 But when more efficient or innovative dealers are emerging,
they are vulnerable to restraints imposed on them by manufacturers
acting at the behest of traditional outlets, which have greater leverage
than the emerging dealers because they account for a much larger vol-
ume of sales. 6 Thus, for example, toy manufacturers acceded to the
45 See Joint Comments of the American Bar Association, supra note 8, at
22 ("large multi-brand retailers (e.g., "Big Box" stores) have buying power that
can effectively block RPM"); Warren S. Grimes, Buyer Power and Retail Gate-
keeper Power: Protecting Competition and the Atomistic Seller, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
563, 579 (2005) (the large multi-brand retailer has "substantial leverage in deal-
ing with even the largest producers of strong brands of consumer products"
and can control whether products "will be priced or marketed aggressively").
Lambert asserts that the growth of large discount retailers has reduced
the likelihood that RPM will be used to facilitate collusion among manufac-
turers or dealers. See Lambert, supra note 17. While that is true, it may be mis-
leading, because the growth of large discount retailers does not indicate that
RPM, when it does occur, is more likely to be procompetitive than before.
Rather, it simply indicates, as Grimes and the ABA recognize, that the pres-
ence of a big discounter like Wal-Mart in a market makes it less likely that
RPM will be imposed in that market for any reason, procompetitive or anti-
competitive. When a big retailer does insist on RPM, the restraint may be
anticompetitive. See infra note 47.
4 For a traditional retailer to be able to force a manufacturer to impose
RPM on a smaller, more efficient dealer, the traditional retailer must not only
account for a substantial volume of the manufacturer's sales, but the manu-
facturer must not be able to replace those sales by turning to other traditional
retailers, the new dealer, new entrants, or forward integration. The traditional
retailer, in short, must have buying power protected by entry barriers. For an
analysis of buying power, see John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary
Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Dis-
crimination and Predatory Bidding?, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 625 (2005). For an exten-
sive analysis of entry barriers, see John B. Kirkwood & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr.,
The Path to Profitability: Reinvigorating the Neglected Phase of Merger Analysis, 17
GEO. MASON L. REV. 39 (2009). Moreover, the traditional retailer must induce
enough manufacturers to adopt RPM that the new dealer cannot grow so rap-
idly through the sale of non-price-maintained products that it undermines the
traditional retailer's market position.
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demands of Toys "R" Us, then the largest toy retailer in many mar-
kets, and refused to sell product to a new and especially promising
method of distribution, warehouse clubs."
E. Excessive services
RPM may also reduce the welfare of consumers when it causes
dealers to provide excessive services. Although RPM is not always a
reliable method of stimulating services," when it is effective it can
sometimes generate an excessive quantity, which can harm consumers
in two principal ways.
1. HARM TO INFRAMARGINAL CONSUMERS Consumers who do not
value the services induced by RPM, but do care enough about the
product to purchase it even if they have to pay more, are hurt by
RPM. They pay higher prices and receive nothing in return. More-
4 See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.
2000). While Toys "R" Us involved a refusal to deal, not RPM, a unit of Toys
"R" Us may have been involved in RPM. Two private suits have been
brought-and the FTC has opened an investigation-because of allegations
that Babies "R" Us, a division of Toys "R" Us, pressured several manufactur-
ers to impose RPM on retailers who were undercutting it. See Joseph Pereira,
Toys "R" Us Faces Federal Antitrust Inquiry-Regulators Probe Whether Retailer
Stifled Discounting by Rivals, Violating an 11-Year-Old Order, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17,
2009, at A3. See also McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, 638 E Supp. 2d 461 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (certifying class and citing evidence that Babies "R" Us coerced suppli-
ers to eliminate Internet discounting).
In both cases, to be sure, the challenged behavior may have enhanced
competition, either by curbing free riding or by providing the defendants
with the margins they needed to carry and promote the products in question.
Absent the restraints, in other words, the low-cost dealers might have been
able to free ride on the defendants' efforts or-simply by constraining their
margins-prevent them from stocking and pushing the manufacturers'
brands. In either case, the loss to consumers from the diminished promotion
or availability of these products at the defendants' stores might have out-
weighed the gains from the growth of more efficient methods of distribution.
See infra part III (discussing the free rider and margin-increase justifications).
See also Lambert, supra note 17, at 200-05 (discussing McDonough). Neither
justification, however, was embraced by the FTC or appellate court in Toys
"R" Us or the district court in McDonough.
4 See infra part III.A.
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over, the harm to these consumers may outweigh the benefits to other
purchasers of the product-consumers who do value the services
engendered by RPM and are willing to pay the higher prices required.
It is this second group of consumers-the marginal consumers-that
motivates the manufacturer's decision to impose RPM, for this second
group increases its purchases in response to the additional services
induced by RPM. But the first group-the inframarginal consumers-
is injured, and it has repeatedly been shown that in plausible circum-
stances, the harm to the first group will exceed the gains to the
second, reducing overall consumer welfare." The circumstances are
plausible because it is reasonable to believe that there are complex or
technical products that a significant number of consumers understand
well enough not to want to pay for additional services or more pro-
motional information.5
4 See William S. Comanor, Vertical Price Fixing and Market Restrictions
and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1990 (1985); William S. Comanor
& John B. Kirkwood, Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust Policy, 3 CONTEMP.
POL'Y ISSUES 9 (1985); F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (1983).
5 See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 44, at 547-48 ("Consumers with high
pre-RPM reservation prices presumably know enough about the product that
they are eager to purchase it even without information provided by the dealer
.... The extra information is of greater value to marginal consumers than to
the more confirmed inframarginal buyers. In effect, the uniform elevation of
prices under RPM makes inframarginal consumers pay a premium for some-
thing of little value to them . . . . Under plausible conditions, a tendency
toward welfare reductions seems more likely than the opposite.").
The conventional objection to this theory is that it is not limited to RPM,
since all advertising and promotional activity may cause some inframarginal
consumers to pay for information or promotion they do not want. But that is
an overstatement. The anticompetitive effect occurs only when the conduct
causes an increase in price, which need not occur with all advertising or pro-
motional activity. Rather, in some cases, a manufacturer of a differentiated
product will advertise it simply to sell more units, paying for the advertising
out of the existing margin on the product. In such cases, the price will not go
up, and may even fall if the increase in sales allows the manufacturer to
achieve greater scale economies. In contrast, RPM typically results in a price
increase. See supra part II.A.
The more serious problem with this theory is the difficulty of applying it
to a specific case. See Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the
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2. SELF-CANCELLING PROMOTION Consumer harm would also
occur when RPM is prevalent in a market and the promotional activi-
ties it induces largely cancel each other out, leaving each manufac-
turer with little increase in output and no significant market share
gain and consumers paying higher prices without a substantial
increase in useful information. In this situation, no manufacturer is
willing to end RPM and switch to a low-service, low-price strategy,
because it would then lose sales to its rivals, but collectively both
manufacturers and consumers are worse off, and economic efficiency
suffers. When promotional activities largely interfere with each other,
in short, the net result is negative, as Scherer and Ross explain:
When most of the firms selling a mature product retain RPM,. .. the sales
increase advantages each seeks by enforcing high dealer margins and
high expenditure on service tend to be cancelled out by the matching out-
lays on rival products, and until the prisoner's dilemma is broken, a
high-service, high-cost equilibrium holds, without appreciable collective
output increases. This ... is almost surely inefficient.s"
F. Misleading promotion
Even when RPM is not widely used, it can still reduce consumer
welfare if the promotional activities it induces are deceptive. Suppose
that only a few manufacturers in a market fix resale prices, causing
dealer margins on their brands to be higher than those on other
brands. This differential is likely to induce some dealers to promote
the price-fixed brands over other brands, even when there is no dif-
ference in quality. The result may be to mislead consumers."
Absence of Free Riding, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 463 (2009) ("It is highly unlikely
that a court could empirically estimate these differential effects between mar-
ginal and inframarginal consumers and accurately determine when total con-
sumer welfare was or was not reduced."). Until developed further, therefore,
the theory may not be appropriate for litigation, but it does provide addi-
tional support for the proposition that RPM is likely to harm consumers in a
substantial number of cases.
51 SCHERER & Ross, supra note 44, at 553; see also Grimes, supra note 34, at 484
("if the restraint is widely employed, no supplier may benefit from its use").
52 See Grimes, supra note 34, at 485 (when only some brands in a market
are subject to RPM, "there is a heightened risk of ... deceptive or misleading
promotion"). The same kind of deception may also occur when RPM is wide-
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G. Likelihood of anticompetitive effects
This catalog of anticompetitive effects shows, as numerous com-
mentators have recognized, that RPM is capable of reducing competi-
tion and harming consumers in multiple ways. The discussion also
provides concrete examples of the best-known mechanisms and indi-
cates that the other anticompetitive effects, even if not demonstrable,
are plausible in certain circumstances. Thus, if the result of the full
rule of reason is to make RPM de facto legal, it seems fair to conclude
that consumers are likely to face substantial harm.-"
The systematic empirical evidence on RPM is consistent with this
conclusion. While it is quite limited in quantity and quality-and thus
makes policy formulation in this area difficult-it does indicate, when
combined with the preceding discussion, that RPM is likely to be anti-
competitive in a significant number of cases. To be sure, like the effi-
ciency evidence discussed in part III, the evidence of anticompetitive
effect does not demonstrate that RPM is always or typically harmful,
spread in a market. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, 1 1633
("Where multibrand dealers are typical, ... widespread coverage within the
manufacturers' market may also mean that the manufacturers use the
restraint to induce dealer recommendations that deceive consumers."). For a
possible example, see Grimes, supra note 34, at 501-02 ("As a result of these
RPM schemes, a golfer shopping for new clubs at a golf shop may be pres-
sured by sales personnel to buy a boutique club (because the dealer will make
a higher margin on this sale) notwithstanding lower price clubs that have
only the narrowest difference in performance.").
There are, of course, other ways to combat deceptive promotion (e.g., tort
doctrines, consumer protection laws), but these may not be effective in polic-
ing point-of-sale activities by dealers. See, e.g., Grimes, supra note 24, at 117-18
("By creating incentives for dealer promotion, RPM makes deceptive or mis-
leading promotion more difficult to monitor and control .... [Sales pitches by
dealers] are usually oral, untranscribed, and difficult to prove. If a consumer
has been misled by an on-site oral pitch, the incentive to bring a court action
is seldom sufficient to overcome the substantial burdens of a law suit.").
5 Of course, a rule of de facto legality might still be the best legal stan-
dard if other legal rules would impose even greater harm on consumers. See
generally Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981). But as this article indi-
cates, a presumption of illegality combined with safe harbors is likely to pro-
mote the welfare of consumers better than a rule of complete immunity.
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or even that anticompetitive cases of RPM are more likely than pro-
competitive cases, though that may be true. What the evidence does
suggest-the systematic empirical data discussed below and the spe-
cific cases of abuse noted above-is that consumers are likely to be
harmed by RPM in a nontrivial number of cases and that a rule of de
facto legality is inappropriate.
Ippolito and Overstreet have conducted the most frequently cited,
systematic reviews of RPM cases.' Both investigate the same two
anticompetitive possibilities-that RPM was used to facilitate collu-
sion among manufacturers or dealers. While each finds that collusion
could have occurred in a significant number of cases, both conclude
that it is unlikely that RPM was adopted to support collusion at either
the manufacturer level or the dealer level in most of the cases
reviewed." Critics have noted, however, that both studies have signif-
icant methodological problems. Ippolito's findings are based on
whether the complaints in the cases she examined contained allega-
tions of collusion. As Justice Breyer remarked, this approach "equates
the failure of plaintiffs to allege collusion with the absence of collu-
sion-an equation that overlooks the superfluous nature of allega-
tions of horizontal collusion in a resale price maintenance case and
the tacit form that such collusion might take."' Overstreet's findings
on collusion at the dealer level are based on the number of dealers
involved, but as Brunell pointed out, "large numbers do not necessar-
54 See Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence
from Litigation, 34 J.L. & ECON. 263 (1991); THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (Bureau of Eco-
nomics Staff Report, Federal Trade Commission 1983).
5 See Ippolito, supra note 54, at 281 ("Only 9.8 percent of the private
cases and 13.1 percent of the entire sample included allegations of dealer or
supplier collusion."); OVERSTREET, supra note 54, at 78 (manufacturer collusion
unlikely in most cases because "a good deal of the RPM reflected in FTC cases
has occurred among small firms selling in markets that are structurally com-
petitive"), at 80 (dealer collusion unlikely in most cases because in the cases
where the number could be determined, the great majority involved more
than 200 dealers).
6 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 920
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Hovenkamp points out that tacit collusion is the
"more serious threat" and is unlikely to have been alleged, since it is not ille-
gal. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 454.
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ily indicate low concentration or the absence of a dominant dealer or
a small number of dominant dealers, and the study does not consider
whether resale price maintenance may have been limited to local mar-
kets in which dealer concentration was high."" If a more detailed
examination of each case could have corrected these problems, it is
likely that both studies would have uncovered more instances in
which RPM posed a threat to competition.'
In addition, the studies relate only to the likelihood of collusion,
not to the other anticompetitive effects described above. If the find-
ings of the studies, adjusted for their shortcomings, were combined
with the other ways in which RPM can reduce competition, the most
plausible conclusion is that RPM is likely to harm consumers in a sub-
stantial number of cases. Justice Breyer's review of theory and evi-
dence led him to a similar conclusion: "[The] studies and analyses ...
suggest (though they cannot prove) that resale price maintenance can
cause harms with some regularity-and certainly when dealers are
the driving force." 9 Overstreet himself declared that "the historical
experience, or practice of RPM [is] largely a sorry record of abuses."60
One reaches a similar conclusion when one looks at the other side of
the ledger-the possible procompetitive explanations for RPM.
7 Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act: Do We Need to Restore the Ban
on Vertical Price Fixing?: Hearing on S. 148 before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com-
petition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
28-29 (2009) (statement of Richard M. Brunell) [hereinafter Brunell]. In addition,
as Overstreet recognized in a later article, one of the best-know dealer cartels in
history, the retail druggists' cartel, "achieved virtually universal compliance
with a price-fixing policy--despite very large numbers and an extremely uncon-
centrated market." Overstreet & Fisher, supra note 36, at 49-50.
5 This seems equally true of a third study, Stanley I. Ornstein, Resale
Price Maintenance and Cartels, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 401 (1985), which reached
similar conclusions and is vulnerable to similar criticisms. See 8 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, [ 1606f. Even without correcting for its shortcom-
ings, moreover, this study concluded that one-third of the cases "may have
involved a cartel" at the manufacturer or dealer level. Ornstein, supra, at 431.
Areeda and Hovenkamp state that this "seems a very substantial threat."
8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23,R 11606f.
9 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 915 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
0 Overstreet & Fisher, supra note 36, at 45.
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III. PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS
The justifications most commonly offered for RPM are likely to be
invalid in a significant number of cases, either because the necessary
preconditions are not satisfied, the benefits are minor, or they can be
achieved in less restrictive ways. This indicates that the net effect of
RPM is likely to be anticompetitive, not procompetitive, in a substantial
number of cases. At the same time, it seems fair to conclude that RPM is
likely to be procompetitive-and benefit consumers-in a considerable
number of other cases. This follows from the result of part I-that RPM
is likely to be anticompetitive in a significant but not overwhelming
number of cases-and from the strength of the theoretical and empirical
support for the justifications most frequently advanced for RPM.
This part examines the three most common justifications for
RPM-that it induces dealer services by curtailing free riding; that it
stimulates dealer services by increasing dealer margins; and that it
improves brand image by eliminating discounting or loss-leader pric-
ing. A fourth common justification-promoting new entry-is dis-
cussed in part VI, where it forms the basis for a safe harbor.
A. Inducing dealer services by preventing free riding
The most prominent justification in the literature is that RPM
induces dealers to furnish presale services by preventing other deal-
ers from free riding on those efforts. The logic is familiar and power-
ful. Suppose that dealer A provides costly services like product
demonstrations but dealer B does not and, as a result, dealer B sells
the manufacturer's product at a lower price. And suppose, to take
advantage of both the valuable services and the lower price, many
consumers watch the demonstrations at dealer A but purchase the
product from dealer B. In this situation, both the consumers in ques-
tion and dealer B are free riding on dealer A's services, and unless
such conduct is curtailed, it is likely to lead A to reduce its provision
of services, harming consumers and the manufacturer alike.
As commentators have recognized, however, this justification,
while impressive in theory, is not applicable in many situations. In
particular, a manufacturer that attempts to justify RPM on the
ground that it prevents free riding must overcome two major hur-
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dles.61 First, the manufacturer must show that the preconditions for the
justification are satisfied. That is, the manufacturer must prove that its
dealers actually provide presale services or other promotional activities
for which they could not charge separately; that absent RPM, some deal-
ers would free ride on those activities; and that this free riding would be
so extensive that it would impair the ability of other dealers to prof-
itably provide the desired services. As Lao notes, those conditions are
not commonly met, since "very few products require dealer demonstra-
tions, consumer education, operational expertise, special showrooms
and the like for effective marketing, and few dealers actually provide
any such services."62 Likewise, Areeda and Hovenkamp declare:
[U]nrestrained intrabrand competition does not lead to substantially
detrimental free riding when dealers provide no significant services (such
as drugstores selling toothpaste), the services they do provide cannot be
utilized by customers who patronize other dealers (luxurious ambience),
the services are paid for separately (post-sale repair), the services pro-
vided are not brand specific and are fully supported by a wide range of
products (high-quality department store), the services can be provided
efficiently by the manufacturer (advertising), or a sufficient number of
consumers patronize the dealers from whom they receive the service. 3
Grimes concurs and concludes that the "economic evidence sug-
gests that free-riding on pre-sale services is not all that widespread."'
Klein states that the "free-riding framework has led to clearly pretex-
tual explanations."65
61 For recent dissections of the free rider justification, see Marina Lao,
Resale Price Maintenance, The Free-Rider Explanation, and United States Antitrust
Policy, in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARIK EFFECT OF CONSERV-
ATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 196 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008);
Grimes, supra note 34; Brunell, supra note 24.
62 Lao, supra note 61, at 201; see also id. at 200 ("[T]he classic free rider
hypothesis, though theoretically valid, has limited applicability.").
63 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, 11 1601e.
(A Grimes, supra note 34, at 476; see also Brief for William S. Comanor &
Frederic M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6, Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480)
("There is skepticism in the economic literature about how often" RPM "is
needed to prevent free-riding and ensure that desired services are provided.").
6 Klein, supra note 50, at 433.
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In some cases, of course, free riding is a legitimate and significant
problem. According to Lao, that is most likely to be true "in the sale of
complex or novel products that require consumer education, or in-
store demonstration to display their features, quality, and general
appeal."6 Moreover, as access to the Internet has grown, the potential
for free riding has increased. It is now easier for many consumers to
free ride by purchasing a product online after checking out its fea-
tures at a brick-and-mortar store.' Given these possibilities, antitrust
law should provide manufacturers with the opportunity to show that
free riding is a significant concern.
Even if free riding is a legitimate and material problem, however,
the manufacturer faces a second issue: Why can't this problem be
solved, or at least substantially mitigated, through some arrangement
short of RPM? The most obvious step is simply to require dealers, as a
condition of retaining their dealerships, to provide the desired services.
Alternatively, a manufacturer could agree to pay its dealers-in the
form of promotional allowances or other stipends-if they perform the
desired services. Either set of contractual arrangements (or a combina-
tion of the two) might induce most dealers to furnish the services the
manufacturer wants, even if some dealers are willing to free ride.'
With respect to some services, of course, it may be impossible for
a manufacturer to specify the quantity and quality it desires.' As a
" Lao, supra note 61, at 200.
67 Even then, however, such free riding may not undermine the incentives
of brick-and-mortar stores to provide services, for there may be even greater free
riding in the opposite direction. Research sponsored by AAI has found evidence
that more consumers gather information about a product online and then pur-
chase it at a brick-and-mortar store than the reverse. See Gregory T. Gundlach,
Kenneth Manning & Joseph Cannon, Free Riding and Resale Price Maintenance:
Insights from Marketing Research and Practice, in this issue of the Antitrust Bulletin.
This article, which identifies pertinent findings from the marketing literature,
helps fill the pressing need for more empirical evidence on the impact of RPM.
6 See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 221 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir.
2000) (rejecting a free rider defense because the services performed by the
retailers, such as advertising, warehousing, and full-line stocking, were com-
pensated by the manufacturers).
69 See Klein, supra note 50, at 453 ("[C]onsider point-of-sale promo-
tional services that take the form of increased salesperson efforts. What is
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result, the manufacturer may be unable to develop enforceable con-
tractual requirements that produce the full range of desired services,
and free riding on the unspecified services may discourage its dealers
from providing them. But even if that is the case-even if contractual
provisions are not an effective way to stimulate all the services the
manufacturer wants-RPM may not solve the problem, since dealers
subject to RPM can still engage in free riding. While RPM prevents
them from lowering the price of the seller's product, it does not
require that they perform any services and does not preclude them
from diverting business from other distributors by offering free ship-
ping, free samples of other products, bundled discounts, or other ben-
efits. As a result, even with RPM, dealers may resort to a significant
amount of free riding.70
the measurable unit of service the manufacturer is purchasing that could be
the basis of a per service retailer compensation formula?").
70 See Peeperkorn, supra note 6, at 209:
RPM does not take away the underlying free rider problem. The
"dominant strategy," as it is called in game theory, is still for each dis-
tributor not to invest in promotion but to free ride on possible invest-
ments made by others and pocket the higher margin. Instead of using
the extra margin for promotion, a distributor will in practice prefer to
invest in other means of attracting customers, means not hindered by
free riding, such as offering lower-priced after-sales services or low-
ered prices achieved through bundling.
RPM will thus not lead to extra promotion outlays, or will do so only
to a limited extent; it is not an efficient instrument for obtaining the
desired efficiency.
See also Klein & Murphy, supra note 24, at 266 ("Even if the manufacturer fixes
the retail price and does not permit price competition, retailers still have an incen-
tive to free ride by supplying nonprice serves that are not desired by the manufac-
turer but are of value to consumers ... say, lower priced tied accessories."); Klein,
supra note 50, at 439 ("Most statements of the theory assume that the only way
retailers can compete, once they cannot reduce price, is by supplying these retailer
services desired by the manufacturer. However, free-riding retailers often will be
able to compete more effectively in other ways. For example, . . . free installation
or liberal return privileges or possibly even more general services, such as conven-
ient free parking, luxurious store furnishing, fast checkout.").
To be sure, the availability of these other means of competing does not mean
that RPM cannot play any rle in curbing free riding, for lowering the price of
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To forestall free riding, a manufacturer needs to address all the
ways that a dealer can engage in free riding, a goal it can accomplish
in many cases through exclusive territories, exclusive distributor-
ships, or other types of selective distribution. These restraints are
more effective in stanching free riding because they reduce the ability
of dealers in a manufacturer's brand from competing with each other
on any dimension. As Grimes points out, the "vertical restraints that
are most likely to limit or prevent free-riding on pre-sale promotion
are those that narrow or limit distribution, such as location clauses or
exclusive territories."" Where these alternatives can be employed,
they appear to be at least as potent as RPM in stimulating dealer serv-
ices, yet unlike RPM, they do not prevent dealers in a manufacturer's
brand from lowering the price of that brand to compete with other
brands.'
The best method of stimulating dealer services may be to combine
some form of selective distribution and with some type of contractual
requirement or inducement. By coupling nonprice restraints with con-
tractual carrots or sticks, in other words, a seller may be able to maxi-
mize its distributors' incentives to provide the desired services. To be
the product may be the most effective way that a free riding dealer can divert
business from a full service dealer.
71 Grimes, supra note 34, at 477; see also Peeperkom, supra note 6, at 209
("Other vertical restraints, such as providing exclusive territories, are much
better equipped to solve the free riding problem."); Klein & Murphy, supra
note 24, at 280 ("Exclusive territories generally have some advantages over
resale price maintenance in terms of a lower dealer shirking potential. The
shirking potential is reduced by eliminating the interdealer free-rider prob-
lem."). A manufacturer can also reduce free riding by distributing different
variations of its products through different dealer classes (e.g., one brand for
warehouse stores and a variant for full-service retailers).
72 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, 1[ 1632b ("there are few
documented instances of significantly impaired distribution" as a result of the
per se ban on RPM). To be sure, selective distribution may have its own draw-
backs. If most sellers practice selective distribution, for example, some indi-
vidual dealers may not carry a full array of competing brands, making it more
difficult for customers to engage in comparison shopping. Yet the alternative
to selective distribution-unrestricted distribution with RPM-is likely to be
less effective in stimulating dealer services and more effective in reducing
price competition.
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sure, territorial restrictions like exclusive territories are likely to be
infeasible in retail markets. But other forms of selective distribution-
such as limiting the number of dealers or refusing to deal with known
discounters-would still be practical, and contractual provisions
would remain an option. Nevertheless, in some cases, no combination
of alternatives may be as effective as RPM in preventing free riding.
As a result, a manufacturer should have the opportunity to raise and
substantiate a free rider justification, forcing the plaintiff to demon-
strate that the restraint had even greater anticompetitive effects.
B. Stimulating dealer services by increasing dealer margins
RPM may also induce dealers to provide valuable services, even
when free riding is not an issue, where dealer profit margins would
otherwise be too small to provide the necessary incentive. Suppose
that the manufacturer's product is highly differentiated from rival
brands and that, as a result, the manufacturer's profit margin is large,
say $30 on each unit it sells. But suppose that its dealers, who com-
pete intensely with each other, earn margins of only $10 a unit. In this
setting, no dealer would have an incentive to incur $20 in promo-
tional costs to sell an extra unit, even though that promotional effort
would benefit the manufacturer and the purchaser. RPM can correct
this problem, by raising dealer margins to a level high enough to
cover the cost of the desired promotion.'
RPM can also correct another source of what Klein calls "incentive
incompatibility."4 Suppose that a dealer's promotion of manufacturer
A's product increases the sales of that product, but those extra sales
n Klein and Murphy are the prime exponents of this theory. In their
view, it explains the use of RPM by "brand name clothing manufacturers
marketing their products through department and specialty stores," such as
London Fog raincoats, Florsheim shoes, and Levi Strauss jeans. Klein & Mur-
phy, supra note 24, at 289 & n.36. The "key features of these cases," according
to Klein and Murphy, are that "the manufacturers have substantial margins
and that retail sales effort and shelf space are key determinants of aggregate
demand, but that these services are not generally subject to consumer free rid-
ing." Id. at 289. Klein elaborates and defends this theory in a recent article.
See Klein, supra note 50.
7 Klein, supra note 50, at 444.
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come entirely at the expense of the dealer's sales of other manufactur-
ers' products. The dealer's promotion, in other words, causes cus-
tomers to shift their purchases among the dealer's products but does
not increase its total sales?h In this circumstance, unless the dealer's
margin on manufacturer A's product is larger than its margin on
other products, the dealer will not promote product A, since that
would raise its costs without increasing its profits. In short, where a
promotion cannibalizes the sales of a dealer's other products, the
dealer's incentives are not aligned with those of the manufacturer,
and RPM, by enhancing the dealer's margin on the manufacturer's
product, can reduce or eliminate the divergence.
In two circumstances, then, RPM can rectify an incentive incom-
patibility and stimulate dealers to provide valuable services they
would not otherwise provide. Like the free rider justification, how-
ever, this justification is unlikely to be valid in other circumstances
and, even when it does apply, may be overbroad. First, if the goal is
simply to enhance dealers' willingness and ability to furnish costly
services by raising their margins, that goal can be accomplished, in
principle at least, in other ways, such as territorial restrictions, limits
on the number of dealers, and refusals to sell to discount outlets.76
Second, those nonprice restraints may be more effective than RPM in
many cases, since, as noted above, dealers subject to RPM-but no
other curbs on intrabrand competition-have a tendency to compete
away some or all of their margins through free goods, bundled dis-
counts, or other forms of indirect price competition, as Klein and
Murphy recognize.' Third, as these authors note, dealers cannot be
7 This necessarily means, as Klein stresses, that the promotion does not
create "inter-retailer demand effects." Id. That is, it does not induce customers
of other dealers to move their business to the dealer in question.
76 Klein states that there is a "fundamental economic equivalence"
between "exclusive territories and resale price maintenance as alternative
ways to compensate retailers for increased promotional efforts.. . ." Id. at 456.
7 See supra note 70; Brunell, supra note 57, at 23. See also Klein, supra note
50, at 457 ("An exclusive territory in some circumstances may have an advan-
tage over resale price maintenance as a way of compensating retailers
because it more effectively reduces inter-retailer free-riding problems and
provides retailers with increased pricing flexibility."). As noted, however,
exclusive territories may not be practical in many retail markets, and other
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trusted to use their higher margins on services and promotional
activity that the manufacturer wants. On the contrary, "the manufac-
turer must always monitor dealer performance and terminate dealers
who violate the implicit contractual understanding regarding the
supply of promotional services."' But if the manufacturer must
always monitor its dealers' activities, it would be in a position to
reward those dealers who perform the desired services with pay-
ments, allowances, or other stipends. It is not clear that it needs to
resort to the less precise and more anticompetitive device of vertical
price fixing.
Of course, a manufacturer may be able to show in a particular
case that no set of alternative arrangements is as cost-effective as
RPM. After all, RPM has one advantage over other arrangements: it
prevents a dealer who skimps on services from increasing sales by
lowering product prices. In contrast, if a manufacturer uses nonprice
restraints, promotional payments, or contractual requirements, a
dealer who fails to provide the desired services can, until it is
detected by the manufacturer, pass on its savings in reduced product
prices. Because of this difference, RPM may create a more effective
incentive structure, and thus be less costly to administer, than any
alternative. On the other hand, a manufacturer that uses RPM must
monitor both its dealers' services and their resale prices, so monitor-
ing costs might actually be higher under RPM.' Because it is not pos-
sible to resolve this issue a priori, a manufacturer should have the
forms of selective distribution may reduce the availability-and exposure-of
the manufacturer's product. See id. ("The major economic advantage of resale
price maintenance . . . is that it permits the manufacturer to have a larger
number of retailers within an area sellling its products.").
78 Klein & Murphy, supra note 24, at 285.
7 Klein, supra note 50, at 459 ("[Iln addition to monitoring minimum
retail prices and preventing free riding, the manufacturer also must moni-
tor retailer performance and terminate those retailers who are not supply-
ing all the manufacturer-specific promotional efforts they have been
compensated to provide."); Grimes, supra note 24, at 112 ("To get the
desired promotion, the producer must monitor both the dealer's perform-
ance of the promotion and the dealer's adherence to the minimum resale
price. As a result, the cost of providing the promotion will be higher when
RPM is employed.").
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opportunity to present evidence that RPM was the most efficient way
to stimulate dealer services that consumers value."
C. Improving brand image by eliminating discounting
and loss-leader pricing
Manufacturers sometimes assert that they need to keep resale
prices high because low prices would be interpreted by consumers as
a sign of poor quality. "We don't want consumers to think we're the
cheapest guys in the world," one producer told The Wall Street
Journal." This asserted justification rests on the premise that con-
sumers lack adequate information about the manufacturer's product
and have to use its price as a gauge of its quality.8 2 If that is true, then
when a dealer discounts a manufacturer's brand or, worse, when a
dealer uses the brand as a loss leader, the image of quality the manu-
facturer wants to project will be tarnished.
As Areeda and Hovenkamp point out, however, the claim that
quality image is inextricably linked to price is not a "powerful one.""
While consumers may lack information about quality when a prod-
uct is first introduced, that is unlikely to persist once the product has
become successfully established in the marketplace. At that point,
consumers have become familiar with the brand and are likely to
" Klein asserts that the increasing-dealer-margin rationale for RPM is
"broadly applicable," and therefore "it is reasonable for antitrust policy to
require demonstration of a likely anticompetitive effect before condemning
the practice." Klein, supra note 50, at 437. For the reasons just noted, how-
ever, this rationale may not be as common as Klein suggests. More important,
even if it is the usual explanation for RPM-and most cases of the practice are
in fact procompetitive-the full rule of reason, under which the plaintiff can-
not proceed unless it first demonstrates likely anticompetitive effects, is not
the most appropriate legal standard. It is likely to exonerate virtually all cases
of RPM, not just the majority. See infra part IV.
81 Joseph Pereira, Price-Fixing Makes Comeback After Supreme Court
Ruling, WALL ST. J., Aug, 18,2008, at Al.
82 See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 44, at 552 (a manufacturer's reputation
for quality is impaired when discounting occurs and "consumers allegedly
judge quality from price").
3 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, 1 1631al.
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regard discounting by a dealer as an opportunity to purchase a good
product at a lower price, not as a sign that its quality has deterio-
rated. Moreover, if there is a significant link between price and per-
ceived quality, the manufacture can influence the resale price, at any
point in the product life cycle, by raising the wholesale price of the
product or refusing to sell it to off-price dealers. In some cases, of
course, consumers may remain uncertain about the quality of an
established product, or they may value certain prestige or status
items precisely because they cost a great deal. In these instances,
brand image might be a legitimate justification for RPM. But in most
cases of known and established products, this justification is likely to
be weak.'
When a dealer cuts the price of a product below the dealer's own
cost-and thus uses the product as a loss leader-there may be an
additional justification for RPM. The manufacturer may want to elim-
inate the loss leading not only to preserve the brand's image of qual-
ity, but also to maintain the size and diversity of its dealer network. In
particular, it may want to retain smaller or more specialized dealers
who cannot afford to sell the product at a loss and would have to
drop it if the price cutting continued. The absence of these dealers
could make the product less accessible or less desirable to some con-
sumers. It could also permit the remaining dealers to collude, tacitly
or expressly, to raise the resale price above the competitive level.
At the same time, however, loss-leader pricing brings immediate
benefits to consumers. It sharply lowers the price of the product, and
like other forms of promotional pricing, may lead consumers to
make beneficial purchases of other products. Moreover, there is no
evidence that the potential harms from loss-leader pricing (reduced
choice of dealers, higher prices in the long run) occur frequently or, if
they do, that they outweigh the benefits of the practice. Areeda and
Hovenkamp observe that "no one has yet adduced any empirical evi-
dence that the hypothesized evils of loss-leader selling occur with
any frequency. Vague complaints of 'unfair loss-leader tactics' are
much more common than actual examples of consumer acceptance
8 In the case of a new product, when consumers are most likely to have
doubts about product quality, the manufacturer would be entitled to a safe
harbor under my approach. See infra part VI.
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being destroyed, rival dealers ruined, or manufacturers prejudiced." 5
For these reasons, a court should not accept the loss-leader justification
for RPM absent a demonstration by the manufacturer that (1) loss-
leader pricing is likely to injure consumers in the long run by reducing
their choices, raising the prices they pay, or causing them to misper-
ceive the quality of a manufacturer's product; and (2) this long-run
injury is likely to outweigh the short-run gains from loss-leader pricing.
D. Likelihood of procompetitive effects
This review of the principal justifications for RPM indicates that
the practice is unlikely to be procompetitive in all or almost all cases.
Each justification is problematic in many circumstances, and a manu-
facturer attempting to defend vertical price fixing on any of these
grounds would face numerous hurdles. As a result, a rule of de facto
legality is difficult to defend: there is no solid basis to conclude that
RPM is likely to benefit consumers in virtually every case.
At the same time, there are many reasons to believe that RPM is
likely to be procompetitive in a substantial number of cases. First, the
justifications just described are theoretically valid in some circum-
stances, and those circumstances do not appear to be rare or highly
unusual. Second, the preconditions for an anticompetitive effect, while
doubtlessly present in some cases, are unlikely to be true as a general
rule, and perhaps not even in the majority of cases. Third, the empirical
evidence reviewed in part II suggests that RPM is likely to harm con-
sumers in a substantial number of cases. It does not demonstrate that
the restraint is invariably or ordinarily anticompetitive. If this assess-
ment is correct, then RPM is likely to be procompetitive in a large num-
ber of cases, perhaps the majority. When RPM was allowed by state fair
trade laws, "it was used in a wide variety of retail markets, including
many lines of clothing (jeans, shoes, socks, underwear, shirts), jewelry,
sports equipment, candy, biscuits, automobiles, gasoline, small and
large appliances (stereos, shavers, washing machines)."' This wide-
spread usage indicates that manufacturers often found RPM to be prof-
a 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, ' 1619; see also id. f 1633d
(rejecting loss leading as a justification for RPM, at least presumptively).
86 Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The Law and Economics of Resale
Price Maintenance, 13 REv. INDUs. ORG. 57, 59 (1998).
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itable. In the absence of evidence that these profits were almost always
anticompetitive gains, RPM was frequently procompetitive.
It is difficult to reach a more precise conclusion without more
empirical evidence or a consensus of the commentators. Thus, while
the Leegin majority rejected the view that RPM is invariably anticom-
petitive, it did not conclude that the restraint is commonly or predom-
inantly beneficial. It merely asserted that efficient uses of RPM are
"not . .. infrequent or hypothetical."" Similarly, in his dissent, Justice
Breyer declared: "But what about benefits? How often, for example,
will the benefits to which the Court points occur in practice? I can
find no economic consensus on this point."'
E. Conclusion
The most reasonable conclusion is that it is unclear how often RPM is
anticompetitive and how often it is precompetitive-or even which effect
predominates-but it is prudent to assume that it harms consumers in a
substantial number of cases and benefits them in a substantial number of
other cases. Neither theory nor evidence convincingly supports the view
that RPM is almost always anticompetitive, or the opposite view that it is
almost always procompetitive. As a result, the ideal legal standard
should neither condemn the vast majority of cases nor immunize virtu-
ally every instance, but should instead distinguish, effectively and at low
cost, between harmful and beneficial RPM. If administered fairly, a pre-
sumption of illegality coupled with safe harbors would achieve that goal.
Historical experience indicates that the full rule of reason would not.
IV. FULL RULE OF REASON
Posner declared that "in practice, [the rule of reason] is little more
than a euphemism for nonliability.""9 Blecher made the same point
87 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894
(2007) ("although the empirical evidence on the topic is limited, it does not
suggest efficient uses of the agreements are infrequent or hypothetical").
8 Id. at 915 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89 Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 14 (1977).
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more colorfully, characterizing the full rule of reason as "a euphe-
mism for an endless economic inquiry resulting in a defense ver-
dict."' Calkins stated: "Beneath the surface lies a truth that plaintiffs
and prosecutors understand all too well: when the full, formal rule of
reason is the governing standard, plaintiffs almost never win.""
These comments reflect the abysmal track record of plaintiffs
under the full rule of reason, whether they are challenging vertical
restraints or other allegedly anticompetitive behavior. Ginsburg
examined all vertical nonprice restraint cases brought between 1977
and 1991, and found that plaintiffs lost forty-one out of forty-five,
more than ninety percent.92 He concluded that Sylvania's adoption of
the rule of reason had resulted in a regime of "de facto legality.""
Crane stated that Kahn had the same effect: Once vertical maximum
price fixing was subject to the full rule of reason, it became "de facto
legal."' In other areas of antitrust law, the full rule of reason has been
equally unfriendly to plaintiffs. Looking at the entire range of rule of
reason cases in the last decade, Carrier found that of the 222 that
reached final judgment, defendants won 221, a towering 99.6%."1
" Maxwell M. Blecher, The Schwinn Case-An Example of a Genuine Com-
mitment to Antitrust Law, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 550, 552 (1975).
91 Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look But
Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 521 (2000).
92 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the
Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 71 (1991).
93 Id. Three of the four cases that plaintiffs won were brought against a
defendant with a high market share. Without such a high share, the plain-
tiff's chances of victory were virtually nil, leading Ginsburg to write: "I con-
clude that non-monopolists have been effectively freed from antitrust
regulation of vertical nonprice restraints." Id. at 67. See also AREEDA & Hov-
ENKAMP SUPP., supra note 23, 1620.1 ("Since the Sylvania decision in 1977,
very few private plaintiffs have successfully challenged vertical nonprice
restraints.").
9 Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1911, 1912 (2009).
95 Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 827, 828 (2009). The only plaintiff's victory was a
government case, United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003). Car-
rier, supra, at 831. Carrier's earlier survey, covering 1977-99, did not present a
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It is unlikely that these results reflect merely a lack of merit in the
plaintiffs' cases. While many of the lawsuits undoubtedly did chal-
lenge harmless or procompetitive behavior-and thus should have
been rejected-the full rule of reason is such a complicated and costly
process that it likely to have prevented a significant number of plain-
tiffs from pursuing worthwhile claims.' After all, the full rule of rea-
son is one of the most demanding legal standards in all of antitrust. It
requires the plaintiff to prove, first of all, that the challenged conduct
had actual anticompetitive effects, or that it was likely to have anti-
competitive effects because the defendant had (or was likely to
obtain) market power and the conduct contributed to that power.
Moreover, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, and the defen-
dant offers justifications for its behavior, the plaintiff must show that
these justifications are inadequate to outweigh the anticompetitive
effects of the conduct, either because the conduct had no procompeti-
tive effects, because its procompetitive effects were relatively small, or
because they could have been achieved in a less restrictive way."
comparable figure, but did note that plaintiffs lost eighty-four percent of the
cases because they failed to show an actual anticompetitive effect or a poten-
tial anticompetitive effect based on proof of market power. See Michael A.
Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV.
1265, 1268 (1999). Neither survey examined settlements.
96 Ginsburg, supra note 92, Crane, supra note 94, and Carrier, The Rule of
Reason, supra note 95, do not examine the merits of the cases the plaintiffs lost
and thus do not conclude that the plaintiffs should have lost such a large pro-
portion of cases. In his earlier article, in contrast, Carrier concluded that the
vast majority of courts had correctly found that plaintiffs failed to show
actual or potential anticompetitive effects. See Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason,
supra note 95. He acknowledged, however, that he was highly deferential to
the courts, treating "decisions as incorrect only where the court flagrantly
miscalculates the net effect on competition or on consumer welfare." Carrier
The Real Rule of Reason, supra note 95, at 1332 n.451. It is entirely possible,
therefore, that a significant proportion of these cases should have been won.
Notably, none of the cases Carrier examined in 1999 involved RPM, the most
competitively dangerous vertical intrabrand restraint.
9 See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1375, 1385-86 (2009) (describing as "an elaborate four-part
minuet" the process of litigation under the full rule of reason: first, the plain-
tiff must establish that the "challenged restraint has had substantial adverse
effects on competition" or, in the absence of actual effects, "plaintiffs can
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Given the scope and complexity of this inquiry, Hovenkamp states
that litigating a rule of reason case is "one of the most costly proce-
dures in antitrust practice."" Overstreet and Fisher characterize rule
of reason cases as "multi-million-dollar litigation monsters" that are
"hardly . . . the most desirable legal solution" to the RPM problem
except for "private lawyers and economic consultants.", Areeda and
Hovenkamp note that "litigation under the rule of reason generally is
extraordinarily expensive in relation to the size of the interest at stake,
and it is likely to be even more costly for a practice that is as poorly
understood and as complex as RPM."roo
The biggest hurdle facing a plaintiff under the full rule of reason is
the first one it must surmount. In order to establish a prima facie case,
the plaintiff must demonstrate either that the challenged practice had
actual anticompetitive effects or that the practice could have had anti-
competitive effects because the defendant had market power.-' Numer-
ous rule of reason cases have failed because plaintiffs could not make
either showing. Ginsburg found, for example, that in over half the non-
price vertical restraint cases that plaintiffs lost, the defeat was due to an
inability to demonstrate either market power or harm to interbrand
competition.'0 2 Carrier's most recent review revealed that out of the 221
cases that plaintiffs lost, they failed in 215 of them (97%) because they
demonstrate the likely anticompetitive effects of a restraint by showing the
defendants' 'market power' "; second, if "plaintiffs meet their initial burden, .
. . the burden of production [shifts] to defendants to provide a procompetitive
justification for the challenged restraint"; third, if the "defendants offer pro-
competitive business justifications, plaintiffs can ... respond by showing. . .
that lesser restrictive alternatives exist for [achieving] the procompetitive
objectives"; and finally, "plaintiffs must ... show that the restraint's anticom-
petitive effects outweigh its procompetitive benefits"). See also GenevaPharm.
Tech Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 507 (2d Cir. 2004) (under the full
rule of reason, the fact finder engages in a "careful weighing of the competi-
tive effects of the agreement-both pro and con-to determine if the effects of
the challenged restraint tend to promote or destroy competition").
98 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 105 (2005).
9 Overstreet & Fisher, supra note 36, at 53-54.
"0 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP., supra note 23, 1620.1.
101 Stucke, supra note 97, at 1385, 1433.
102 Ginsburg, supra note 92, at 75.
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could not show an actual or probable anticompetitive effect 1 3 Since Lee-
gin, several RPM cases have been dismissed on the pleadings because
the complaint did not properly allege a relevant market."
As these cases suggest, it is not easy to show that a restraint could
harm competition because the defendant has (or is likely to attain)
market power. Establishing market power is normally a daunting
project, since the plaintiff must define a relevant market (in both
product and geographic terms), measure the defendant's share of that
market, and demonstrate the existence of significant barriers to entry
and expansion. Developing evidence on all of these issues normally
requires extensive discovery and expensive economic experts," and
the issues are often so complex, fact-specific, and contested that there
is no assurance of success. For these reasons, Stucke attributes much
of the burden of the full rule of reason to the market power hurdle:
"Defining a relevant market, by itself, is fact-intensive, time-consum-
ing, costly, and imprecise."108 Justice Breyer singled out the market
power requirement in explaining why he opposed subjecting RPM to
the full rule of reason: "The Court's invitation to consider the exis-
tence of 'market power' .. . invites lengthy time-consuming argument
among competing experts, as they seek to apply abstract, highly tech-
nical, criteria to often ill-defined markets."" Areeda and Hovenkamp
concur: "One of the biggest hurdles for future RPM plaintiffs is likely
to be the market power requirement.""
103 Carrier, The Rule of Reason, supra note 95, at 829. The comparable fig-
ure in Carrier's earlier survey was 84%. See Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason,
supra note 95, at 1268.
1o4 Brunell, supra note 57, at 8.
'0 See Stucke, supra note 97, at 1466 ("expert antitrust testimony is often
necessary for antitrust plaintiffs to prevail under the rule of reason," since
market definition must usually be based on expert opinion, not lay testimony).
106 Id. at 1462.
107 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 917
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
108 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP., supra note 23, 1620.1; see also MiLToN
HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 210 (4th ed. 1997)
("In theory and practice, relevant market definition is as difficult an under-
taking as any in antitrust.").
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Establishing actual anticompetitive effects is unlikely to be much
easier, principally because the vast majority of courts now appear to
be unwilling to find an anticompetitive effect in the absence of proof
of market power. Carrier's review of recent rule of reason decisions
found that plaintiffs were unable to show an anticompetitive effect in
215 cases. In 208 of these (97%), the courts expressly noted that plain-
tiffs had failed to address or demonstrate market power."
In view of these hurdles, the full rule of reason is likely to discour-
age many plaintiffs, especially small dealers, from bringing actions to
challenge RPM, even when it is anticompetitive. Indeed, if the record
of the last thirty years is a reliable guide, the full rule of reason is
likely to operate as a rule of de facto legality, absolving nearly all deci-
sions by manufacturers or dealers to adopt RPM. And even if the
future is not so dire, "many instances of anticompetitive RPM may go
unchallenged.""o This unwise result is made more likely by the Leegin
Court's failure to adopt any presumptions helpful to plaintiffs,
thereby signaling to the lower courts that RPM should be condemned
only when the plaintiff carries its entire set of burdens under the rule
of reason. The law should adopt a more discriminating approach.
V. TRIGGERED PRESUMPTIONS
The triggered presumption or "quick look" analysis suggested by
the FTC in Nine West.' does not appear to be the answer. While it
would permit more meritorious cases than the full rule of reason, it is
still likely to impose large burdens on many plaintiffs and thus is
likely to be inferior to the approach recommended in this article-pre-
sumptive illegality combined with safe harbors. In Nine West, as
109 See Carrier, The Rule of Reason, supra note 95, at 830 (in 110 cases, the
courts concluded "that the plaintiff does not show an anticompetitive effect
without addressing market power"; in 66 cases, the courts simply found "a
lack of market power"; in 32 cases, the courts asserted "that there is no anti-
competitive effect and no market power").
110 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP., supra note 23, i 1620.1 (under the full
rule of reason, without "assistance from the Antitrust Division or the FTC,
many instances of anticompetitive RPM may go unchallenged").
I" In re Nine West Group Inc., No. C-3937, 2008 WL 2061410 (FTC May 6,
2008).
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noted earlier, the FTC stated that Leegin might be read to allow the use
of a truncated or "quick look" rule of reason analysis if the plaintiff
establishes the existence of one or more of the factors mentioned in
Leegin-market power at the manufacturer or dealer level, wide-
spread use of RPM within the relevant market, or imposition of RPM
on the manufacturer by a dealer. Once a plaintiff establishes one or
more of these factors, RPM would be deemed "inherently suspect"
and presumptively illegal.112
The FTC's approach would be an improvement over the full rule
of reason because it would enable the plaintiff, in many circum-
stances, to make out a prima facie case and thus trigger a presump-
tion of illegality-without proving all the preconditions of a theory of
anticompetitive effect. For example, if the plaintiff showed that the
defendant had market power, the plaintiff would not also have to
prove that the RPM facilitated collusion at the manufacturing level,
suppressed an innovative dealer, stimulated excessive services, or in
some other way fit a recognized theory of anticompetitive harm. The
RPM would be presumed to be anticompetitive simply because the
defendant had market power.
Because each of the Leegin factors is difficult to establish, however,
the FTC's approach would be less desirable than the approach pro-
posed here, under which a plaintiff could create a rebuttable presump-
tion of illegality merely by proving the existence of an agreement to
maintain resale prices."' Two of the Leegin factors would almost
112 For a description of the FTC's general approach to "inherently sus-
pect" restraints, see Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 416 F.3d 29
(D.C. Cir. 2005), where the D.C. Circuit upheld the approach as an acceptable
form of "quick look" rule of reason analysis.
113 While I have used "merely" to distinguish the burdens of my
approach from those of a full or triggered rule of reason, it may not be easy
for a plaintiff to establish an agreement to maintain resale prices. Given the
Supreme Court's decisions in Colgate and Monsanto, a plaintiff cannot prove
the necessary agreement without direct evidence of an exchange of commit-
ments between the manufacturer and one or more of its dealers. See United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (no agreement is created when a
manufacturer simply announces that it will refuse to sell to dealers who do
not adhere to its specified resale prices, even if the dealers thereafter adhere
to those prices); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)
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always impose substantial burdens on plaintiffs. Demonstrating that a
manufacturer or dealer, or group of manufacturers or dealers, had
market power would entail the same difficult, time-consuming, and
uncertain process that the full rule of reason requires of most plaintiffs.
If a small dealer had to define a relevant product and geographic mar-
ket, show that the defendant (or a group of firms including the defen-
dant) had a substantial share of that market, and demonstrate that the
market was protected by high entry barriers in order to trigger a pre-
sumption of illegality, many meritorious cases would be discouraged.
Establishing another Leegin factor-that the source of the restraint
was a dealer, not the manufacturer-would be even more difficult. In
order to show that RPM was anticompetitive because it served dealer
interests rather than those of the manufacturer, it would not be
enough to show that the idea came from a dealer. The dealer could
simply have pointed out to the manufacturer that another dealer was
engaging in detrimental free riding and that RPM would halt such
behavior. In order to show that RPM was anticompetitive, the plaintiff
would have to prove that the reason the restraint was adopted was
that it was imposed by a dealer (or group of dealers) on the manufac-
turer against its will. Making such a showing would often be excep-
tionally challenging because it would require proving both that the
dealer (or group of dealers) had market power and that it was the
exercise of this power, not the perceived efficiency benefits of RPM,
that caused the manufacturer to adopt the restraint. In effect, the
plaintiff would have to identify and disprove the most likely procom-
petitive justifications for the restraint, more than it would have to do
under the full rule of reason.11
(an agreement to maintain resale prices cannot be established without show-
ing that the manufacturer sought an assurance from a dealer that the dealer
would comply with the manufacturer's specified resale prices, and the dealer
gave that assurance). Of course, proof of agreement would not be a problem if
a manufacturer, in the wake of Leegin, practiced RPM openly. But if the manu-
facturer maintained resale prices through surreptitious agreements with cer-
tain dealers or by exercising its Colgate rights, the plaintiff's burden could be
difficult or impossible to discharge.
114 See Varney, supra note 15, at 25 (in order to show retailer-driven RPM,
"the presence of both market power and retailer coercion are critical; manu-
facturer response to complaints about discounters is insufficient"). Of course,
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The third Leegin factor-that RPM was widely used in the relevant
market-would be easier to establish, but it would still present signif-
icant challenges. The plaintiff would have to define a relevant product
and geographic market and show that the manufacturers using RPM
account for a large share of that market. As noted above, the first ele-
ment-market definition-is frequently difficult for a small firm, and
the second element-pervasiveness-is not easy. If a dealer purchases
from a single manufacturer, it may not know whether other manufac-
turers maintain resale prices. It may know that dealers in other prod-
ucts rarely discount, but it may be unable to say, without extensive
discovery, whether that is due to unilateral dealer decisions or agree-
ments with the other producers. Areeda and Hovenkamp concur:
"The usual plaintiff is a terminated dealer or, less frequently, a class of
consumers challenging a single manufacturer. Apart from a multi-
brand dealer or cartel member, the parties to the lawsuit may have no
personal knowledge of the practices of other manufacturers."115 In
many cases, in short, the Leegin factors are likely to make it quite diffi-
cult for a plaintiff, particularly a small dealer, to challenge an anti-
competitive instance of RPM.
Grimes has proposed an alternative trigger, one that would be
easier for plaintiffs to establish. Grimes would create a presumption
of illegality whenever RPM is used in an open distribution system."'
An open distribution system, under his approach, is one in which the
manufacturer does not "substantially limit[] distribution in order to
encourage dealer commitment and loyalty.""' Because this approach
would make RPM presumptively illegal in any open distribution sys-
tem, it would be an improvement over both the full rule of reason and
the plaintiff may be able to discharge this burden if it finds e-mails showing
that "the manufacturer was never convinced that it would be better off if it
adopted RPM or [that it] actually was worse off after imposing RPM . . . ." Id.
at 24 (noting the presence of such e-mails in the Babies "R" Us matter dis-
cussed supra note 47).
"; 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, 1633.
116 Grimes, supra note 34, at 492 (advocating a "presumption ... that
open distribution restraints (such as vertical minimum price fixing or sup-
plier-imposed limits on dealer discount advertising) are unlawful").
117 Id. at 493.
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the truncated rule of reason suggested in Nine West. It would not,
however, be as useful as a broad presumption of illegality combined
with safe harbors for two reasons.
First, the courts cannot resolve the easy cases as quickly under the
Grimes approach as under mine. When RPM is plainly unjustified
because the manufacturer cannot offer any significant justification for
it, the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case-and create a
presumption of illegality-under Grimes' approach without showing
that the manufacturer's distribution system was open rather than
closed, a showing that may raise significant evidentiary issues. My
proposal would not require such a showing. Likewise, when RPM is
highly likely to be innocuous because it is employed by a new
entrant, my approach would end the litigation by granting a safe har-
bor to the entrant. Grimes' approach would require the fact finder to
determine whether the entrant had a procompetitive justification, an
issue that could not normally be resolved without appraising whether
the entrant could have used exclusive territories, slotting payments,
or some other alternative. Second, RPM may be less justified in a
restrictive distribution system than in an open distribution system.
The most common justification offered for RPM is the free riding sce-
nario, but as noted above, free riding is less likely to be a serious
problem in a restricted distribution system. When a manufacturer
limits the number of its dealers, diminishing competition among
them, it reduces their ability and incentive to free ride on each other's
activities. To the extent free riding is a significant problem in the man-
ufacturer's distribution system, then, there is reason to impose a
greater presumption of illegality in a restricted system than an open
system. A broad presumption of illegality, applicable to both open
and closed distribution systems, would address the anticompetitive
potential of RPM in both settings.
VI. PRESUMPTIVE ILLEGALITY WITH SAFE HARBORS
The approach I propose would create a presumption of illegality
for RPM and two safe harbors. If administered fairly, and there is
good reason to believe it would be, this approach would be superior
to all the major alternatives-per se illegality, per se legality, the full
rule of reason, and a truncated rule of reason triggered by the Leegin
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factors. Unlike any of these alternatives, my approach would resolve
both sets of easy cases (those in which RPM is plainly harmful and
those in which it is clearly beneficial) correctly and at low cost. More-
over, my approach would be superior to the two per se rules and at
least as good as the two types of rule of reason in resolving the
harder, mixed cases, where RPM has both anticompetitive and pro-
competitive effects.
A. Burdens of proof and production
Under my proposal, the plaintiff would establish a prima facie case
by proving that the defendant entered into a vertical agreement to main-
tain resale prices. The plaintiff would not have to show, at this stage of
the litigation, that the defendant has market power, that the restraint is
likely to have anticompetitive effects, or (in lieu of market power and
likely effects) that it had actual anticompetitive effects. If the plaintiff
meets this burden, then the RPM agreement would be presumed illegal
and the burden would shift to the defendant to rebut the presumption.
The defendant could do so by producing substantial evidence that
its conduct is entitled to a safe harbor or that it has a procompetitive
business justification. Under either route, the plaintiff would be
allowed to dispute the defendant's evidence, but if the defendant
proves the existence of a safe harbor, then the presumption would be
conclusively rebutted. If the defendant advances a justification, the
plaintiff could introduce evidence that the prerequisites for the justifi-
cation are not satisfied or that its efficiency benefits could be achieved
through a less restrictive alternative. If the plaintiff puts forward an
alternative, the defendant could respond with evidence that the alter-
native would have been significantly more costly or less effective than
RPM. If so, the ultimate burden of establishing a less restrictive alter-
native would fall on the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff fails to undermine the defendant's justification-by
showing that it is invalid, insignificant, or unnecessarily restrictive-
the burden would shift back to the plaintiff to show that the
restraint's anticompetitive effects exceeded its procompetitive bene-
fits, reducing the welfare of consumers. To make this showing, the
plaintiff would have to set forth a theory of anticompetitive harm-
HeinOnline  -- 55 Antitrust Bull. 464 2010
RETHINKING ANTITRUST POLICY : 465
for example, that the RPM facilitated collusion at the dealer level-
and show that the preconditions for this theory existed. In nearly
every instance, that would entail proof that a manufacturer or dealer,
or a group of manufacturers or dealers, had market power."' In addi-
tion, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate that that the anticom-
petitive effects that flowed from its theory of harm were likely to
outweigh the procompetitive effects of the defendant's justification.
B. Safe harbors
My approach would create a limited safe harbor for established
manufacturers and a broad safe harbor for new entrants.
1. ESTABLISHED MANUFACTURERS An established manufacturer that
uses RPM would be entitled to a safe harbor if it proves that it does
not have significant market power, that none of its dealers has signifi-
cant market power, and that most other manufacturers in the market
(measured by sales volume) do not maintain resale prices. Proof of
these three conditions would entirely or almost entirely remove the
possibility of significant harm from any of the anticompetitive effects
described in part II above. It is highly unlikely, for example, that RPM
facilitated collusion at the manufacturing level if the great majority of
manufacturers did not engage in RPM or otherwise maintain resale
prices."' Likewise, excessive or misleading dealer promotion is
unlikely to have occurred when there was intense competition at both
the manufacturing and dealer levels, and a manufacturer that induced
excessive or misleading promotion by its dealers was likely to face
both price and nonprice competition in response.
To be sure, it will not always be easy for a manufacturer to show that
neither it nor its dealers had significant market power and that main-
tained prices, whether accomplished by agreement or otherwise, were
118 The exception is deceptive promotion, which can cause consumer
harm, at least for a time, even though the dealers engaging in it, and the man-
ufacturer who stimulated it, do not have significant market power.
119 A manufacturer can maintain resale prices without RPM by refusing
to sell to off-price dealers or by cutting off full-price dealers when they
engage in discounting. While these alternatives may not be as effective as
RPM, they can have a significant impact on resale prices.
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not pervasive in the market. As the earlier discussion made clear, litiga-
tion of the issues of market power and pervasiveness can often be a chal-
lenging and expensive process, one that may discourage some
manufacturers from asserting this safe harbor, even when they would be
entitled to it. But there will be clear cases, and the existence of this safe
harbor will make it easier to dispose of them. Where the manufacturer is,
by widespread agreement, a small factor in the market, where its dealers
are numerous and small, and where dealers in rival brands discount
them regularly, the safe harbor could be established without difficulty. In
Nine West, for example, the FTC resolved several of these issues without
apparent hesitation, concluding that the company's "use of resale price
maintenance is not likely to harm consumers."" In clear cases, in short,
my approach would readily eliminate nonmeritorious suits.
This safe harbor is also subject to dynamic conditions beyond a
manufacturer's control. If other producers adopt RPM, the first manu-
facturer in the market to use RPM might no longer be eligible for the
safe harbor. Similarly, if one of its dealers becomes dominant in a geo-
graphic market, the manufacturer could no longer rely on the safe
harbor. This would not mean, of course, that the manufacturer's RPM
had become anticompetitive; it would only mean that the manufac-
turer would have to present evidence of a procompetitive justification
in order to rebut the presumption of illegality. Over time, as courts
gain experience with this safe harbor, it could be made more precise,
e.g., by picking specific market shares and concentration levels below
which market power would be conclusively presumed to be absent.'
The safe harbor could also be enlarged if warranted. What is impor-
12 See In re Nine West Group Inc., No. C-3937, 2008 WL 2061410, at 6 (FTC
May 6, 2008) ("On the record before us, it appears that Nine West has only a
modest market share in any putative relevant products market in which it
competes. This suggests prima facie that it lacks market power, and there is no
reason to believe that there is collective market power in any putative market.
There is also no evidence of a dominant, inefficient retailer in this market.").
121 The task is somewhat complicated because a manufacturer is most
likely to use RPM for procompetitive reasons if its products are differentiated
from those of its closest rivals. As a result, the manufacturer is likely to have
some market power because of this differentiation. Nevertheless, a court
might conclusively presume that the manufacturer lacked significant market
power if its share of a properly defined relevant market was under 15% and
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tant at this stage is establishing the principle that cases of plainly
innocuous RPM should escape the presumption of illegality.
2. NEW ENTRANTS For the same reason, a manufacturer that
employs RPM to help it enter a new market would be entitled to a
safe harbor. In this setting, RPM may be procompetitive because it is
the most efficient way to induce dealers to promote the new product,
but even if it is not--even if a less restrictive alternative would work
as well-RPM is highly unlikely to be anticompetitive.
New entrants often face a free rider problem. When they enter a new
market, they frequently need dealers to promote their new brand in
order to help it become established, but if those promotions are success-
ful, other dealers will also want to carry the product and those dealers
did not incur the promotional costs incurred by the original dealers. As a
result, the latter can undercut the former and prevent them from recoup-
ing their outlays. RPM can solve this free rider problem by, as Steiner
puts it, inhibiting "Johnny-come-lately" stores from siphoning off the
rewards that pioneering dealers need for their "missionary work."m
market concentration was below 1500. The same figures might be applied to
dealer markets, though higher ceilings would be appropriate (say 25% and
2500) if the manufacturer proved that its dealers were small, sold only its
brands, and were easily replaced.
122 Steiner, supra note 40, at 430; see also Mathewson & Winter, supra note
86, at 60 ("In markets where extensive distribution systems are necessary,
RPM is often used in the early part of a product's life cycle to aid in the estab-
lishment of the distribution system. In this situation, which holds for markets
as diverse as those for stereo components and jeans, RPM lowers the barriers
[to] entry into upstream markets. ").
Even when dealers do not need to engage in expensive promotional
activity on behalf of a new product, RPM may facilitate new entry by reduc-
ing the risks that dealers face in carrying an untried product. If the product is
unsuccessful, the dealers may have to mark it down sharply in order to sell
off their inventory. If the product is successful, the dealers may be unable to
earn high profits on it because other dealers decide they want to carry it too.
RPM can reduce both risks by making it more likely that dealers earn signifi-
cant profits on a new product, whether it is successful or not. See Lambert,
supra note 17. Of course, a manufacturer may be able to alleviate those risks
in other ways: it can help dealers unload inventory by accepting returns of
unsold units at full price, and it can protect dealer margins on successful
products by limiting the number of authorized dealers.
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Like all free riders arguments, however, this one is a valid justifi-
cation for RPM only if the new entrant could not achieve its promo-
tional goals in other, less restrictive ways. Many commentators have
observed that free riding on pioneering dealers' promotional efforts
can be reduced, if not eliminated, through nonprice restraints such as
selective distribution," or through up-front payments or other incen-
tives to the pioneering dealers. 124 In addition, rather than relying on
dealers to create demand, manufacturers may create demand for a
new product themselves, through advertising or other consumer-
directed marketing. If any of these alternatives is as effective and effi-
cient as RPM, a new entrant would not need to employ RPM in order
to gain a foothold in a new market.
Despite these objections, a safe harbor for new entrants appears
appropriate for two reasons. First, the likelihood of significant, persist-
ent anticompetitive effects is very low. After all, new entry is, by defini-
tion, a time limited process: it ends as soon as the firm becomes
established in the market." Moreover, new entrants are easy to identify,
they are unlikely to gain market power in the near term, and there will
be only one or a few of them at any given time, reducing the danger of
collusion. For these reasons, even prominent opponents of RPM, who
generally favor a per se ban, have been willing to create an exception
for new entrants." Second, in this setting, where the prospects of anti-
competitive harm are so low, a firm is more likely to choose the distri-
bution arrangement that is most efficient. If the entrant cannot
123 See, e.g., 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, 1617a3 (while the
new entry rationale makes sense as a justification for exclusive territories, it
"seems presumptively inapplicable to resale price maintenance").
124 See, e.g., Peeperkorn, supra note 6, at 212 ("it seems more efficient, both
for the manufacturer and for the consumers, if the manufacturer rewards the
investments made by the first distributor through a lump sum payment").
125 Id. at 211 ("this is not a justification to allow RPM for a long period, or
... for established brands").
126 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case
for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1495 (1983). See
also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 917-18
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("And if forced to decide now, at most I might
agree that the per se rule should be slightly modified to allow an exception for
the more easily identifiable and temporary condition of 'new entry."').
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reasonably expect to gain significant market power during the entry
process, then its margin for error is small. It is unlikely to enjoy any
cushion-any supracompetitive margin-that would protect it if its
distribution strategy was not the most cost-effective. Although entrants
do make mistakes, and most of them perish, there is greater reason to
presume in this setting that RPM is the least restrictive alternative.
C. Justifications
Under my approach, a defendant could rebut the presumption of
illegality by establishing a safe harbor, demonstrating a significant
procompetitive justification, or both. In order to demonstrate a signifi-
cant procompetitive justification, a defendant would have to show
that the justification was theoretically valid, that it was significant in
magnitude, and that if the plaintiff asserts a less restrictive alterna-
tive, there are problems with it. Areeda and Hovenkamp describe
these requirements in a particularly thoughtful way:
To define a justification in terms that can realistically be proved, we can
reasonably expect at least substantial evidence that the manufacturer has
a legitimate business problem, that resolution of that problem would con-
fer a nontrivial benefit, that the restraint can be reasonably effective for
the claimed purpose, and that less restrictive alternatives would be signif-
icantly more costly or significantly less effective."
This formulation, while sensitive to the practical limits of proof, is
nevertheless demanding, and it is likely that many defendants would
not be able to satisfy it. But that is appropriate, for RPM is likely to be
anticompetitive in a substantial number of cases. As part III indicated,
however, both economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that
RPM is likely to be procompetitive in a substantial number of cases. It
is important, therefore, that the approach I propose be administered
in a way that gives manufacturers a reasonable opportunity to over-
come the presumption of illegality. This presumption should not
become, as it may have become in Europe, a conclusive presumption
of illegality, a per se ban in disguise.
Fortunately, there is considerable reason to expect that American
courts would administer a presumption of illegality in a balanced
12 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, 1 1633.
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way. First, in recent decades American courts have become more cau-
tious about finding antitrust liability and more sympathetic to eco-
nomic justifications of business practices. Today, approximately
fifty-six percent of federal appellate court judges were appointed by
Republican presidents,'" and judges at all levels recognize that eco-
nomics plays a crucial role in antitrust analysis.' 9 Both perspectives
are likely to cause courts, in their findings of fact and instructions to
juries, to take an open-minded-rather than dismissive-approach to
economic arguments on behalf of RPM. Second, the Supreme Court
has now declared, on three separate occasions, that vertical intra-
brand restraints are frequently procompetitive and thus should be
evaluated under the rule of reason, not condemned per se." This con-
sistent message, reiterated in Leegin itself, is likely to make courts
receptive to assertions that RPM is procompetitive and skeptical of
claims that it is harmful. Finally, in most cases the defendant is likely
to be able to advance a plausible justification for RPM, since, as part
III made clear, there are several well-known, theoretically valid, pro-
competitive explanations for the practice. To be sure, the plaintiff is
bound to assert that the manufacturer's procompetitive goals could
be achieved in a less restrictive way, but on that issue, the plaintiff has
the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of proof.
Moreover, if the plaintiff cannot show that there was an effective and
practical alternative to RPM, the plaintiff would be forced to prove
that the anticompetitive effects of the restraint outweighed its benefi-
cial effects, a task that would ordinarily require the plaintiff to under-
take the daunting project of establishing market power. All these
reasons make it unlikely that my approach would simply become a
rule of per se illegality.
128 Alex Kingsbury, The Long Road to Remaking the Courts, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 1, 2009, at 54.
12 See John B. Kirkwood, Consumers, Economics, and Antitrust, in 21 RES.
L. & EcoN., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS I (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004).
130 See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
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VII. CONCLUSION
RPM is both the most competitively dangerous vertical intrabrand
restraint and a practice that is likely to benefit consumers in a sub-
stantial number of cases. As a result, the ideal legal standard for RPM
is an approach that distinguishes, effectively and at low cost, between
anticompetitive and procompetitive instances of RPM. While the Lee-
gin majority asserted that the full rule of reason could play this role, it
did not acknowledge what every scholar who has looked at the issue
has found-that the full rule of reason has operated in practice as a
standard of de facto legality, absolving almost every restraint it has
examined. By requiring plaintiffs to prove, as a threshold matter, that
the defendant has significant market power or that its behavior
caused actual anticompetitive effects, the full rule of reason has made
it almost impossible for plaintiffs, particularly the small dealers that
typically bring vertical restraint cases, to succeed, even when their
actions have merit.
A superior approach would combine a presumption of illegality
with safe harbors. Unlike the full rule of reason, or any of the other
major alternatives (per se illegality, per se legality, or a truncated rule
of reason triggered by the Leegin factors), this approach would allow
courts to dispose relatively quickly of both sets of easy cases, those in
which RPM is clearly anticompetitive (because the manufacturer can-
not offer a significant justification) and those in which it is highly
likely to be innocuous (because, say, the manufacturer is a new
entrant). This approach would also be no more costly to administer
and no less accurate than the full rule of reason in the more difficult
cases, those in which RPM has both procompetitive and anticompeti-
tive effects.
Leegin invited the lower courts to structure the full rule of reason,
and even develop presumptions, as they gain experience applying the
standard over time."' This article suggests that the courts should
develop presumptions soon, for experience with RPM cases under the
full rule of reason is unlikely to be of much help in determining how
often the practice is anticompetitive and how often it is procompeti-
tive. If this standard operates as it has in the past, then the vast major-
131 551 U.S. at 898-99 (majority opinion).
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ity of cases are likely to be dismissed, even when RPM is anticompeti-
tive, because plaintiffs cannot meet its burdensome requirements. In
order to obtain better information on the competitive impact of
RPM-and reduce the incidence of incorrect results-courts should
adopt a broad but fully rebuttable presumption of illegality combined
with safe harbors.
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